Application of game theory in ad- hoc opportunistic radios by Mumtaz, S. et al.
     Application of Game Theory in Ad- hoc 
Opportunistic Radios  
 
Shahid Mumtaz*,P.Marques, A.Gameiro, Jonathan Rodriguez    
Institute of Telecommunication,Aveiro,Portugal. 
*smumtaz@av.it.pt 
 
 
Abstract  The application of mathematical analysis to the study 
of wireless ad hoc networks has met with limited success due 
to the complexity of mobility, traffic models and the dynamic 
topology. A scenario based UMTS TDD opportunistic cellular 
system with an ad hoc behaviour that operates over UMTS 
FDD licensed cellular network is considered. In this paper, we 
describe how ad hoc opportunistic radio can be modeled as a 
game and how we apply game theory based Power Control in 
ad-hoc opportunistic radio. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A wireless ad hoc network is characterized by a distributed, 
dynamic, self-organizing architecture. Each node in the 
network is capable of independently adapting its operation 
based on the current environment according to 
predetermined algorithms and protocols. Analytical models 
to evaluate the performance of ad hoc networks have been 
scarce due to the distributed and dynamic nature of such 
networks. Game theory offers a suite of tools that may be 
used effectively in modeling the interaction among 
independent nodes in an ad hoc network [8].Here we 
assume a cognitive radio is a radio that can change its 
transmitter parameters based on interaction with the 
environment where it operates [1], and additionally 
relevant here is the radios ability to look for, and 
intelligently assign spectrum holes on a dynamic basis 
from within primarily assigned spectral allocations. The 
detecting of   holes and the subsequent use of the 
unoccupied spectrum is referred to as opportunistic use of 
the spectrum. An Opportunistic Radio (OR) is the term used 
to describe a radio that is capable of such operation [2].In 
this paper we use the opportunistic radio system which was 
proposed in [3] that shares the spectrum with an UMTS 
cellular network. This is motivated by the fact that UMTS 
radio frequency spectrum has become, in a significant 
number of countries, a very expensive commodity, and 
therefore the opportunistic use of these bands could be one 
way for the owners of the licenses to make extra revenue. 
The OR system exploits the UMTS UL bands, therefore, the 
victim device is the UMTS base station, likely far from the 
opportunistic radio, whose creates local opportunities. 
These potential opportunities in UMTS FDD UL bands are 
in line with the interference temperature metric proposed by 
the FCC s Spectrum Policy Task Force [4]. The interference 
temperature model manages interference at the receiver 
through the interference temperature limit, which is 
represented by the amount of new interference that the 
receiver could tolerate. As long as OR users do not exceed 
this limit by their transmissions, they can use this spectrum 
band. However, handling interference is the main challenge 
in CDMA networks, therefore, the interference temperature 
concept should be applied in UMTS licensed bands in a 
very careful way. In this paper we propose how an ad hoc 
behaviour uses in an opportunities radio and with careful 
selections of routing schemes, we minimize overall 
interference level on the victim device UMTS base station.  
This paper is organized as follows: In Section II the 
scenario is defined. Section III explains the opportunistic 
network with ad-hoc topology. Section IV explains the 
game theory in opportunistic radios. Section V  explains the 
use of game theory in opportunistic network and section VI 
describe OR power control using game theory, followed by 
the conclusion.  
II. SCENARIO DEFENITION 
The UMTS is a DS-CDMA system, thus all users transmit 
the information spreaded over 5 MHz bandwidth at the 
same time and therefore users interfere with one another. 
Figure 1 shows a typical UMTS FDD paired frequencies. 
The asymmetric load creates spectrum opportunities in UL 
bands since the interference temperature (amount of new 
interference that the UMTS BS can tolerate) is not reached. 
 
 
 
In order to fully exploit the unused radio resources in 
UMTS, the OR network should be able to detect the vacant 
channelization codes using a classification technique 
[5].Thus the OR network could communicate using the 
remaining spreading codes which are orthogonal to the used 
by the UMTS network. However, classify and identify 
CDMAs codes is a very computational intensive task for 
real time applications. Moreover, synchronization between 
UMTS UL signals and the OR signals to keep the 
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ortogonality between codes will be a difficult problem. Our 
approach is to fill part of the available interference 
temperature raising the noise level above the original noise 
floor. This rise is caused by the OR network activity, which 
aggregated signal is considered AWGN (e.g CDMA, MC-
CDMA, OFDM).We consider a scenario where the 
regulator allows a secondary cellular system over primary 
cellular networks. Therefore we consider opportunistic 
radios entities as secondary users. The secondary 
opportunistic radio system can use the licensed spectrum 
provided they do not cause harmful interference to the 
owners of the licensed bands i.e., the cellular 
operators.Specifically we consider as a primary cellular 
network an UMTS system and as secondary networks an ad 
hoc network with extra sensing features and able to switch 
its carrier frequency to UMTS FDD frequencies. Figure 2 
illustrates the scenario where an opportunistic radio 
network operates within an UMTS cellular system. We 
consider an ah hoc OR network of M nodes operating 
overlapped to the UMTS FDD cell. The OR network acts as 
a secondary system that exploit opportunities in UMTS UL 
bands. The OR network has an opportunity management 
entity which computes the maximum allowable transmit 
power for each OR node in order to not disturb the UMTS 
BS. 
 
Figure 2: Ad hoc ORs networks operating in a licensed UMTS UL band 
 
III. THE OPPORTUNISTIC NETWORK WITH AD 
HOC TOPOLOGY 
The opportunistic network, showed in Figure 3, will 
interface with the link level simulator through LUTs. The 
propagation models developed for the UMTS FDD network 
will be reused, and the entire channel losses (slow and fast 
fading) computed. The outputs will be the parameters that 
usually characterize packet transmissions: Throughput, 
BLER and Packet Delay. The LUT sensing algorithm 
characterization block contains the cyclostationary 
detectors performance, i.e. the output detection statistic, d, 
as a function of the SNR measured at the sensing antenna 
for different observation times [6]. The sensing OR-UMTS 
path loss block estimates the path loss between UMTS BS 
and the OR location through the difference between the 
transmitted power and the estimated power given by 
cyclostationary detector (LUT sensing algorithm 
characterization block output). The OR traffic generation 
block contains real and non-real time service traffic models 
OR QoS block defines the minimum data rate, the 
maximum bit error rate and the maximum transmission 
delay for each service class The non-interference rule block 
compute the 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Block diagram of the system level platform 
 
 maximum allowable transmit power without disturbing the 
UMTS BS applying a simple non-interference rule 
(according to policy requirements).In the following, we 
briefly explain the opportunistic network blocks that was 
designed and implemented, using a C++ design 
methodology approach. 
First of all, we assume that the OR knows a priori the 
UMTS carrier frequencies and bandwidths, which has been 
isolated and brought to the baseband. In order to get the 
maximum allowable power for OR communications the OR 
nodes need to estimate the path loss from its location to the 
UMTS BS, i.e., the victim device. The opportunistic user is 
interested in predefined services which should be available 
every time. This motivates the proposal of defining a set of 
usable radio front end parameters in order to support the 
demanded services classes under different channel 
conditions. Basically, at the beginning of each time step the 
opportunistic radio requires certain QoS guarantees 
including certain rate, delay and minimum interference to 
the primary user (non interference rule policy).  
The opportunistic network has an opportunity management 
entity which computes the maximum allowable transmit 
power for each opportunistic node in order the aggregated 
interference do not disturb the UMTS BS. The aggregated 
transmit power allowed to the opportunistic network can be 
computed using a simple non-interference rule 
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Where GOR is the OR antenna gain, GBS is the UMTS BS 
antenna gain, Lp is the estimated path loss between the OR 
node and the UMTS BS, K is the Number of ORs, 
performed by a sensing algorithm, and Nth is the thermal 
noise floor. µ is a margin of tolerable extra interference 
that, by a policy decision, the UMTS BS can bear. Finally, 
 is a safety factor to compensate shadow fading and 
sensing s impairments. Notice if the margin of tolerable 
interference =0 the OR must be silent.  is a safety factor 
margin (e.g. 6-10 dB) to compensate the mismatch between the 
downlink and uplink shadow fading and others sensings 
impairments. The margin of tolerable interference is defined 
according to policy requirements. 
Employing scheduling algorithms, we can provide a good 
tradeoff between maximizing capacity, satisfying delay 
constraint, achieving fairness and mitigating interference to 
the primary user. In order to satisfy the individual QoS 
constraints of the opportunistic radios, scheduling 
algorithms that allow the best user to access the channel 
based on the individual priorities of the opportunistic 
radios, including interference mitigation, have to be 
considered. The objective of the scheduling rules is to 
achieve the following goals: 
 Maximize the capacity; 
 Satisfy the time delay guarantees; 
 Achieve fairness; 
 Minimize the interference caused by the 
opportunistic radios to the primary user. 
A power control solution is required to maximize the 
energy efficiency of the opportunistic radio network, which 
operates simultaneously in the same frequency band with an 
UMTS UL system. Power control is only applied to address 
the non-intrusion to the services of the primary users, but 
not the QoS of the opportunistic users. 
A distributed power control implementation which only 
uses local information to make a control decision is of our 
particular interest. Note that each opportunistic user only 
needs to know its own received SINR at its designated 
receiver to update its transmission power. The fundamental 
concept of the interference temperature model is to avoid 
raising the average interference power for some frequency 
range over some limit. However, if either the current 
interference environment or the transmitted underlay signal 
is particularly non uniform, the maximum interference 
power could be particularly high. 
IV. GAME THEORY IN OPPORTUNISTIC RADIO 
NETWORKS 
A wireless ad hoc network is characterized by a distributed, 
dynamic, self-organizing architecture. Each node in the 
network is capable of independently adapting its operation 
based on the current environment according to 
predetermined algorithms and protocols. So, we are 
choosing analytical models to evaluate the performance of 
ad hoc networks with opportunists radio access have been 
scarce due to the distributed and dynamic nature of such 
networks. Game theory offers a suite of tools that may be 
used effectively in modeling the interaction among 
independent OR nodes in an ad hoc network 
we are choosing analytical models to evaluate the 
performance of ad hoc networks with opportunists radio 
access have been scarce due to the distributed and dynamic 
nature of such networks. Game theory offers a suite of tools 
that may be used effectively in modeling the interaction 
among independent OR nodes in an ad hoc network. 
 
Game theory 
Game theory is a field of applied mathematics that 
describes and analyzes interactive decision situations. It 
provides analytical tools to predict the outcome of complex 
interactions among rational entities, where rationality 
demands strict adherence to a strategy based on perceived 
or measured results. The main areas of application of game 
theory are economics, political science, biology and 
sociology. From the early 1990s, engineering and computer 
science have been added to this list. We limit our discussion 
to non-cooperative models that address the interaction 
among individual rational decision makers. Such models 
are called games and the rational decision makers are 
referred to as players. In the most straightforward 
approach, players select a single action from a set of 
feasible actions. Interaction between the players is 
represented by the influence that each player has on the 
resulting outcome after all players have selected their 
actions. Each player evaluates the resulting outcome 
through a payoff or utility function representing its 
objectives. 
There are two ways of representing different components 
(players, actions and payoffs) of a game: normal or strategic 
form, and extensive form. Here we will focus on the normal 
form representation.  
Formally, a normal form of a game G is given by  
 
G = { N, A, {ui }} 
 
where N={1,2,...,n} is the set of players (decision makers), 
Ai is the action set for player i,   
A = A1 × A2 ×,...,× An is the Cartesian product of the sets of 
actions available to each player, and {ui }={u1 ,..., un} is the 
set of utility functions that each player i ,wishes to 
maximize, where ui : A  R . For every player i, the utility 
function is a function of the action chosen by player i, ai  
and the actions chosen by all the players in the game other 
than player i, denoted as a-i .Together, ai and a-i make up 
the action tuple a . An action tuple is a unique choice of 
actions by each player. From this model, steady-state 
conditions known as Nash equilibria can be identified. 
Before describing the Nash equilibrium we define the best 
response of a player as an action that maximizes its utility 
function for a given action tuple of the other players. 
Mathematically, a   is a best response by player i to a-i  if 
 
a  {arg  max ui (ai , a -i )} 
 

Nash equilibrium (NE) is an action tuple that corresponds to 
the mutual best response: for each player i, the action 
selected is a best response to the actions of all others. 
Equivalently, a NE is an action tuple where no individual 
player can benefit from unilateral deviation. Formally, the 
action tuple  
 
a * = ( a1* , a2 *, a3 *,  .. ., an *) is a NE if ui (a1*  , a-i * )  
(a1*  , a-i * )  for all  ai  Ai   and for all  i  N.  
 
The action tuples corresponding to the Nash equilibria are a 
consistent prediction of the outcome of the game, in the 
sense that if all players predict that Nash equilibrium will 
occur then no player has any incentive to choose a different 
strategy. There are issues with using the Nash equilibrium 
as a prediction of likely outcomes (for instance, what 
happens when multiple such equilibria exist?). There are 
also refinements to the concept of Nash equilibrium tailored 
to certain classes of games. A detailed discussion of these is 
outside the scope of this deliverable. There is no guarantee 
that a Nash equilibrium, when one exists, will correspond to 
an efficient or desirable outcome for a game (indeed, 
sometimes the opposite is true). Pareto optimality is often 
used as a measure of the efficiency of an outcome. An 
outcome is Pareto optimal if there is no other outcome that 
makes every player at least as well off while making at least 
one player better off. 
Mathematically, we can say that an action tuple   
 a = (a1, a2, a3,..., an) is Pareto optimal if and only if there 
exists no other action tuple  
 b = (b1, b2, b3,..., bn) such that ui (b)  (a)  for  i  N , and  
for some k  N  u k  (b )   u k  (a ). 
 
V. USING GAME THEORY IN OPPORTUNISTIC 
NETWORKS 
For over a decade, game theory has been used as a tool to 
study different aspects of computer and telecommunication 
networks, primarily as applied to problems in traditional 
wired networks. In the past three to four years there has 
been renewed interest in developing networking games, this 
time to analyze the performance of wireless ad hoc 
networks (ORs). Since the game theoretic models 
developed for ad hoc networks focus on distributed 
systems, results and conclusions generalize well as the 
number of players (ORs) is increased. It is also of interest to 
investigate how selfish behavior by individual nodes (ORs) 
may affect the performance of the UMTS system as a 
whole.In a game, players (ORs) are independent decision 
makers whose payoffs depend on other players (OR) 
actions. Nodes (OR) in an ad hoc network are characterized 
by the same feature. This similarity leads to a strong 
mapping between traditional game theory components and 
elements of an ad hoc network. Table 1 shows typical 
components of an ad hoc networking game. Game theory 
can be applied to the modeling of an ad hoc network at the 
physical layer (distributed power control), link layer 
(medium access control) and network layer (packet 
forwarding). Applications at the transport layer and above 
exist also, although less pervasive in the literature. A 
question of interest in all those cases is that of how to 
provide the appropriate incentives to discourage selfish 
behavior. Selfishness is generally detrimental to overall 
network performance; examples include a nodes increasing 
its power without regard for interference it may cause on its 
neighbors (layer 1), a nodes immediately retransmitting a 
frame in case of collisions without going through a backoff 
phase (layer 2), or a nodes refusing to forward packets for 
its neighbours (layer 3). 
 
Table 1: Typical mapping of ad hoc network components to a 
game 
 
Components of a game 
 
Elements of an ad hoc 
network 
Players 
 
Nodes in the network 
Strategy Action related to the 
functionality  
Being studies(e.g. the decision 
to forward packets or not, the 
setting of power level, the 
selection of 
waveform/modulation scheme) 
 
Utility function Performance metrics(e.g. 
throughput, delay, target 
signal-to noise ratio) 
 
VI. USING GAME THEORY FOR OR POWER 
CONTROL 
Transmit-power control is necessary for the opportunistic 
radio system to broaden the scope of its applications and 
enhance the performance. It would have to operate under 
two limitations on network resources: the interference 
temperature limit imposed by regulatory agencies, and the 
availability of a limited number of spectrum holes 
depending on usage. In a multiuser opportunistic radio 
(ORs) environment, all the users operate in a decentralized 
manner; they are characterized by cooperation and 
competition. In such a case,  game theory could be applied 
to exercise control over the transmit power. Distributed 
power control may be adopted by a node (OR). From a 
physical layer perspective, performance is generally a 
function of the effective signal-to-interference-plus-noise 
ratio (SINR) at the node(s) of interest. When the nodes in a 
network respond to changes in perceived SINR by adapting 
their signal, a physical layer interactive decision making 
process occurs. This signal adaptation can occur in the 
transmit power level and the signaling waveform 
(modulation, frequency, and bandwidth). The exact 
structure of this adaptation is also impacted by a variety of 
factors not directly controllable at the physical layer, 
including environmental path losses and the processing 
capabilities of the node(s) of interest. A game theoretic 
model for physical layer adaptations can be formed using 
the parameters listed in Table 2. 

From Table 2 , the stage game for interactive physical layer 
adaptations can be modeled as 
G = { N, { Pj   × j },{uj (P, , H ) } 
 
For a general game, each OR node, j, selects a power level, 
pj, and a waveform, j, based on its current observations 
and decision making process. Distributed power control 
systems permit each OR radio to select pj, but restrict  j to 
a singleton set; distributed waveform adaptation systems 
(interference avoidance) restrict the choice of pj, but allow 
j to be chosen by the physical layer. 
Power control, though closely associated with cellular 
networks and is implemented in OR ad hoc network that 
operated in the same bands that the primary user UMTS 
system We now model the power control algorithm 
suggested in [9] as a normal form game. Note that a similar 
approach can be followed to model the other distributed 
algorithms as games, with each game involving a different 
utility function. We adopt the notation in Table 2 
For most game models, the game theoretic         equivalent 
of a distributed algorithms steady state is a Nash 
equilibrium (NE). An action vector (or alternative vector) a 
is said to be a NE if equation (1) is satisfied. 
 
        ui (a)  ui (bi , a -i)  i  N, bi  N               (1)                                                          
 
Consider a DS-CDMA system  with a centralized receiver 
where all OR nodes other than the centralized receiver are 
adjusting their transmitted power levels in an attempt to 
maximize their signal-to interference- plus-noise ratio 
(SINR) as measured at the receiver. Here our set of players 
are the OR nodes (other than the centralized receiver); the 
action sets are the available power levels (presumably a 
finite number of power levels) all OR players utility 
functions are given by equation (2) 
 
)((1/K) /  )(
\
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phiu Nj
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where pi is the transmitted power of node i, K is the 
statistical estimate of the spreading factor, hi is the gain 
from a node to the receiver, and  is the noise at the 
receiver.  
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Figure 4: 3 OR node closer to the UMTS system 
 
As would be indicated by intuition, the unique Nash 
equilibrium for this game is the power vector where all OR 
nodes transmit at maximum power. This is an undesirable 
outcome as (1) capacity is greatly diminished  due to near-
far problems (unless the nodes are all at the same radius 
from the receiver as shown in the Figure 4 and Figure 5 
where OR node are closer and far away from the UMTS 
system),  equation  (2) the resulting SINRs are unfairly 
distributed  (the closest node will have a far superior 
SINR(as shown in the  Figure 4)  
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Figure 5: 5 OR node far away to the UMTS system 
 
to the furthest node(as shown in the Figure 5 and (3) battery 
life would be greatly shortened. However, this outcome is 
Pareto optimal as any more equitable power allocation will 
reduce the utility of the closest node, and any less equitable 
allocation will reduce the utility of the disadvantaged nodes. 
In this scenario Pareto optimality actually misleads the 
analyst with respect to the desirability of the outcome. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
 Emerging research in game theory based power control 
applied to ad hoc opportunist  networks shows much 
promise to help understand the complex interactions 
between OR nodes in this highly dynamic and distributed 
environment. Also, the employment of game theory in 
modeling dynamic situations for opportunist ad hoc 
networks where OR nodes have incomplete information has 
led to the application of largely unexplored games such as 
games of imperfect monitoring. Ad hoc security using game 
theory is the future area of research in ORs 
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